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Abstract. Matching problems is a well studied class of coalitions forma-
tion models. Several core-like type solutions have been proposed for these
models. However, unlike what happens in game theory, no balancedness
properties have been introduced to study existence problems so far. In
this paper we state a balancedness condition on a many-to-one matching
problem with preferences over colleagues which turns to be a necessary
and sufficient condition to guarantee the non-emptiness of the set of core
matchings. We use this result to improve a recent characterization about
the existence of core matchings for the classical many-to-one matching
problem without preferences over colleagues. Our approach has been car-
ried out by using some techniques and results from the theory of hedonic
games, which is another class of coalitions formation models.
1 Introduction
Matching problems is a well studied class of coalitions formation models since
the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [12]. The books of Gusfield and Irving
[13] and Roth and Sotomayor [20] provide a very good introduction to several of
the aspects that have been dealt with during the last years on this area. Among
the models studied, many-to-one and many-to-many matching problems (see for
instance Martinez et al. [16], Echenique and Oviedo [9], [10]) have received par-
ticular attention. A classical approach assumes that agents are endowed with
preferences not depending on colleagues. However, Dutta and Masso´ [7], and
more recently Echenique and Yenmez [11] and Dimitrov and Lazarova [6], incor-
porate dependence of the preferences over colleagues into the model and study
existence problems of stable matchings. Dutta and Masso´ [7] consider some re-
strictions on the preference profiles and their main results are obtained under the
assumption that individual preferences satisfy some lexicographical behavior. On
the other hand, by using an algorithmic approach, Echenique and Yenmez [11]
deal with the existence problem of stable matchings in a very general framework.
The stability notions studied in these two papers are related to core concepts
properly defined within the models considered. However, the conditions stated
there to guarantee existence of the stable solutions are not related to any notion
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of balancedness of families of coalitions as the connection with core-type solu-
tions could suggest. The main objective of this paper is to introduce a notion of
balancedness for a matching problem, and then to prove that its is necessary and
sufficient to guarantee the non-emptiness of the set of core matchings. In proving
our results we are going to appeal to the notion of stable∗ matchings (Echenique
and Oviedo [11]) in the framework of many-to-one matching problems with pref-
erences over colleagues. Stability∗ is, in some sense, an intermediate notion of
stability between that of stability and core-stability. It is worth noting that the
set of stable∗ matchings coincides with the set of stable matchings in the classical
many-to-one matching problem with substitutable preferences (Echenique and
Oviedo [9]), while it also coincides with the set of core-partitions in the classical
many-to-one matching problem (Echenique and Oviedo [9]). A stable∗ partition
is a partition resistent to objections raised by a particular class of intermediate
coalitions.
To get our objective we will associate, to each matching problem, a hedonic
game. Then, we will show that stable∗ matchings are related to core-partitions
of the associated game. Hedonic games, in the form that we are going to use
here, were first dealt with in Banerjee et al. [1] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson
[4], although hedonic aspect in economic models were previously studied, for
instance, in Dre`ze and Greenberg [8]. The literature on hedonic or simple coali-
tion formation games has grown considerably, in the last decade, dealing mainly
with existence and uniqueness issues of core-partitions (see also Pa´pai [17], Iehle´
[14]). We point out that Pycia [18] shares our objective ``... to develop our un-
derstanding when stable matchings exist.´´. Nevertheless, although the hedonic
game associated to a matching problem we will use here to get our result is
basically stated in his paper, his results have a very different flavor than ours. In
a recent paper, Dimitrov and Lazarova [6], in the framework of many-to-many
matching problems, also relate coalition formation models and matching prob-
lems in a way that resembles our approach. In this paper, total balancedness
Bloch and Diamantoudi [3] of some related coalition formation game to a given
many-to-many matching problem, shows up in connection to the existence prob-
lem of some kind of stable matchings in the latter problem. Finally, we would
like to mention Kominers [15] who also relates a classical many-to-one matching
problem to a many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues to
develop an algorithm to compute the set of all stable matchings for the classical
matching problem. The matching problem with preferences over colleagues that
he constructs, coincides with ours in Section 5 when dealing with the classical
matching problem. In both cases, the preferences are lexicographical (see Section
5).
Recently, Cesco [5], for classical many-to-one matching problems, states a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of stable∗ matchings. The
condition is given in terms of the pivotal balancedness (Iehle´ [14]) of an asso-
ciated hedonic game. The main result of this note (Theorem 5) improves that
characterization by providing another one stated in terms of the p-balancedness
(Section 3) of an associated many-to-one matching problem. This new problem
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has, however, preferences depending, in a lexicographical way, over colleagues.
Besides the paper of Dutta and Masso´ [7], Dimitrov and Lazarova [6] also deal
with different notions of lexicographical preferences but although they resem-
ble closely the way we use to construct the lexicographical preferences in the
just mentioned many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues,
none of the resulting domains of preferences coincide with ours, not even in the
case that one of the set of agents has cardinality one. In Revilla [19], in the
framework of matching problems with preferences over colleagues, two sufficient
conditions guaranteeing the existence of stable matchings are provided but they
are not however, related to our.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce hedonic
games with restrictions on the set of coalitions and the concept of core-partition
as well in this setting. We also recall the notion of ordinal balancedness due to Bo-
gomolnaia and Jackson [4] and that of pivotal balancedness due to Iehle´ [14] and
state conditions under which there exist core partitions in hedonic games with
a restricted family of coalitions. Section 3 is devoted to many-to-one matching
problems with preferences over colleagues and recall the notion of stable∗ match-
ings and introduce the definition of p-balanced matching problem. In Section 4
we construct, related to any many-to-one matching problem with preferences
over colleagues, a hedonic game with restricted family of coalitions. We show a
relationship between the set of stable∗ matchings of the matching problem with
the weak core of the associated hedonic game. We use that relationship to prove
our main theorem which states that the set of stable∗ matchings of a match-
ing problem is non-empty if and only if the matching problem is p-balanced. In
the next section we concentrate on the classical many-to-one matching problem.
First we show how to construct its lexicographical extension, which is another
many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues. For this class of
matching problems the results of Section 4 can be used to improve a characteri-
zation about the non-emptiness of the set of stable∗ matchings given in Cesco [5].
In a final Appendix we present the construction of a hedonic game associated to
a classical many-to-one matching problem used in the characterization of Cesco
[5].
2 Hedonic Games
A hedonic game with a family of admissible coalitions, also called a simple coali-
tion formation model (Banerjee et al. [1], Papa´ı [17]) is defined by a non-empty
finite set N = {1, ..., n}, the players, a collection A of non-empty subsets of N
such that {i} ∈ A for each i ∈ N, the family of admissible coalitions, and a pref-
erence profile = (i)i∈N where, for each i ∈ N, i is a complete3 and transitive
binary relation on A(i), the elements of A containing i. We will use (N,;A)
to denote a hedonic game with A as its family of admissible coalitions. For each
i ∈ N,i will stand for the strict preference relation derived from i (x i y iff
x i y but yix), and PA(N) will indicate the family of partitions of N such that
3 In our formulation, completeness of a preference implies reflexivity.
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all the elements in the partitions belong to A. Given pi = {pi1, ..., pip} ∈ PA(N)
and i ∈ N, pi(i) will denote the unique set in pi containing player i. When A = N ,
the whole family of non-empty subsets of N, (N,;A) is called simply a hedonic
game and it is denoted by (N,). The case A 6= N was first studied in Papa´ı
[17] and recently in Cesco [5].
Given (N,;A) and a partition pi ∈ PA(N), we say that T ∈ A blocks pi if
for each i ∈ T, T i pi(i).
Definition 1 The core C(N,;A) of (N,;A) is the set of partitions
blocked by no coalition.
A partition pi belonging to C(N,;A) is a core-partition.
An individual preference i is strict if A i B and A 6= B implies that BiA.
When all the preferences in the preference profile  of a hedonic game (N,;A)
are strict, then pi ∈C(N,;A) if and only if there is no T ∈ A such that T i pi(i)
for all i ∈ T, and T i pi(i) for at least one i ∈ T (weak blocking). We denote
with slCW (N,;A) the set of partition weakly blocked by no coalition. Clearly,
always slCW (N,;A) ⊆ slC(N,;A).
Let b = (bA)φ6=A∈A be a family of non-negative vectors in Rn satisfying:
bAi = 0 for all i /∈ A, and bNi > 0 for all i ∈ N. A non-empty subfamily B ⊆ A
is b-balanced (Billera [2]) if there exist positive weights λ = (λA)A∈B such that∑
A∈B
λA.b
A = bN . Given a coalition A ∈ A, χA will stand for the n-dimensional
indicator vector of A, namely, χAi = 1 if i ∈ A and if i /∈ A. In the case that for
each coalition A ∈ A, bA = χA, and bN = χN (provided N /∈ A), b-balancedness
coincides with the classical notion of balancedness (see Shapley [21]).
A family I = (I(A))A∈A is called an A-distribution, or simply a distribution
(Iehle´ (2007)) if, for each coalition A ∈ A, I(A) ∈ A and I(A) ⊆ A. Given a
distribution I, a family B ⊆ A is I-balanced if it is b-balanced with respect to
b = (χI(A))A∈A.
Definition 2 (N,;A) is ordinally balanced if for any balanced family
B ⊆ A there exists pi ∈ PA(N) such that, for each i ∈ N, pi(i) i B for some
B ∈ B(i), being B(i) the set of coalitions in B containing player i. Ordinal
balancedness is due to Bogomolnaia and Jackson [4]) for the case A = N\{φ}.
Definition 3 (N,;A) is pivotally balanced with respect to anA-distribution
I if for each I-balanced family B, there exists a partition pi ∈ PA(N) such that,
for each i ∈ N, pi(i) i B for some B ∈ B(i). The game is pivotally balanced if
it is pivotally balanced with respect to some distribution I.
This general concept of balancedness is due to Iehle´ [14] for the caseA = N\{φ}).
The first part of the following theorem is a sufficient condition for the ex-
istence of core-partitions for hedonic games with coalitional restrictions which
parallels the first part of Theorem 1 in Bogomolnaia and Jackson [4], while the
second part parallels the characterization given in Theorem 3 of Iehle´ [14], and
whose proofs are carried out in a similar way.
Theorem 1 Let (N,;A) be a hedonic game.
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Va) If the game is ordinally balanced, and has strict individual preferences,
then C(N,;A) is non-empty.
b) C(N,;A) is non-empty if and only if the game is pivotally balanced.
3 Many-to-one matching problems
A many-to-one matching problem with preferences over colleagues consists of
two disjoint finite sets of agents, the sets C of colleges and the set S of students.
For any family B of subsets of S ∪C, and for any f ∈ S ∪C,B(f) will stand for
the subfamily of B of those sets containing b. Let S denote the family of subsets
of S. We will use CS to denote the collection of all sets of the form {c} ∪ A for
some c ∈ C,A ∈ S, along with the individual sets {s}, s ∈ S. In the model it is
assumed that each college c ∈ C is endowed with a preference over CS(c), and
that each student s ∈ S has a preference over CS(s). Individual preferences are
assumed to be strict, complete and transitive on their corresponding domains.
We denote a many-to-one matching problem by (C, S;C ,S), whereC=
(c)c∈C and S= (s)s∈S are the preference profiles of the colleges and stu-
dents respectively. A matching in (C, S;C ,S) is a function µ : C ∪ S → CS
satisfying:
a) For each c ∈ C, µ(c) = {c} ∪A with A ∈ S.
b) For each s ∈ S, if µ(s) = {c} ∪A for some c ∈ C, then A ∈ S(s).
c) For each c ∈ C, s ∈ S, if s ∈ µ(c), then µ(s) = µ(c), and if c ∈ µ(s), then
µ(s) = µ(c).
µ(s) = {s} means that student s wants to stand alone rather to join any
college c. Similarly, µ(c) = {c} means that college c wants no student to be
joined to him.
It is easy to show that this definition is equivalent to the definition of match-
ing in many-to-one matching problems with preferences over colleagues given
by Etchenique and Yenmez [11]. They also introduce two solution concepts, the
core and the set of stable∗ matchings, whose definitions we recall below adapted
to the notation we are using in this paper.
A matching µ is blocked by an individual agent s ∈ S if {s} >s µ(s), and by
an agent c ∈ C if {c} >c µ(c). A matching µ is individually stable if it is blocked
by no individual agent.
Given a many-to-one matching problem, (C, S;C ,S), the core C(C, S;C
,S) is the set of matchings for which there is no Cˆ ⊆ C, Sˆ ⊆ S, Cˆ ∪ Sˆ 6= φ,
and a matching µˆ such that, for all c ∈ Cˆ, s ∈ Sˆ it holds that:
a) µˆ(c) = {c} ∪ A for some A ⊆ Sˆ, µˆ(s) = {c′} ∪ A for some c′ ∈ Cˆ,
A ⊆ Sˆ, s ∈ A.
b) µˆ(c)c µ(c).
c) µˆ(s)s µ(s).
d) µˆ(f) >f µ(f) for at least one f ∈ Cˆ ∪ Sˆ.
A matching µ is blocked∗ by c ∈ C,B ⊆ S if B ∩ µ(c) = φ and there exists
A ⊆ µ(c) so that for every s ∈ A∪B, {c}∪A∪B >s µ(s) and {c}∪A∪B >c µ(c).
A matching µ is stable∗ if it is individually stable and there is no pair c ∈ C, φ 6=
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B ⊆ S blocking∗ µ. S∗(C, S;C ,S) will stand for the set of stable∗ matchings
of (C, S;C ,S). The following result, which states that the core and the set
of stable∗ matchings coincide, is also due to Echenique and Yenmez [11], Lemma
3.2).
Theorem 2 Let (C, S;C ,S) be a many-to-one matching problem. Then,
S∗(C, S;C ,S) = C(C, S;C ,S).
4 Balanced matching problems
In some cases, the core of a many-to-many matching problem can be the empty
set, so a natural question is if there is a characterization of the class of problems
having non-empty core. Moreover, since there is a close relationship between
matching models and hedonic games, it seems to be natural too to ask if such
a condition involves some kind of balancedness characteristic. The aim of this
section is to introduce a balancedness condition which characterizes the class
of many-to-many matching problems, with preferences over colleagues, having
non-empty core. The condition that we introduce below resembles that of pivotal
balancedness, which characterizes hedonic games with non-empty set of core-
partitions (Ihele´ [14]).
Definition 4 A many-to-one matching problem with preferences over col-
leagues (C, S;C ,S) is p-balanced if there exists a distribution I ⊆ CS such
that, for each I-balanced family of coalition B ⊆ CS there exists a matching
µ such that, for each f ∈ C ∪ S, µ(f) f B for at least one B ∈ B(f).
(C, S;C ,S) is balanced if I = CS.
We want now to show that p-balancedness characterizes matchings problems
with non-empty core. To this end, to any given many-to-one matching problem
(C, S;C ,S), with preferences over colleages, we associate a hedonic game
whose construction is described below.
Let N = C ∪ F and A = CS. We now define the following preference profile
related to the members of N. For each i ∈ N ∩ C, namely, if i = c for some
c ∈ C, and A and B are two coalitions in A(i),we say that
A i B if and only if Ac B. (1)
On the other hand, if i ∈ N ∩ S, namely, if i = s for some s ∈ S, and A and B
are two coalitions in A(i), we say that
A i B if and only if As B. (2)
Thus, if = (i)i∈N , (N,;A) is a game related to the many-to-one match-
ing problem having strict individual preferences.
Given a partition pi ∈ PA(N), there is a related matching µpi for the many-
to-one matching problem, namely,
µpi(c) = pi(c), (3)
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and
µpi(s) = pi(s). (4)
Conversely, related to any matching µ of a many-to-one matching problem
there is a partition piµ ∈ PA(N) defined as follows. For each c ∈ C, let
piµc = µ(c), (5)
and for each s ∈ S such that µ(s) = {s}, let piµs = {s}. Then piµ = {piµf : f ∈
F} ∪ {piµs : s ∈ S and µ(s) = {s}}. It is clear that, for each s ∈ S,
piµ(s) = µ(s). (6)
Lemma 3 Let (C, S;C ,S) be a many-to-one matching problem, µ a
matching and piµ its related A-partition in (N,;A). If µ is individually stable
in (C, S;C ,S) then piµ is blocked by no individual coalition in (N,;A)
(individual rationality). Conversely, if pi is individually rational in (N,;A)
then µpi is individually stable in (C, S;C ,S).
Proof Let µ be individually stable. Then, for each s ∈ S, µ(s) s {s}.
But since piµ(s) = µ(s) it follows that piµ cannot be blocked by any individual
coalition {s}, s ∈ S. On the other hand, assume that there is {c} c piµ(c)
in (N,;A) for some c ∈ C. This would imply that {c} >c µ(c). But this
contradicts the individual stability of µ. Thus, piµ is individually rational.
Conversely, let pi be individually rational in (N,;A). This means that for
all i ∈ N, pi(i) i {i}. But this means that µpi(i) i {i}, either i ∈ C or i ∈ S.
But this implies that µpi is individually stable.
Proposition 4 Let (C, S;C ,S) be a many-to-one matching problem
and (N,;A) its related hedonic game. If µ ∈ slS∗(C, S;C ,S) then piµ ∈
slCW (N,;A). Conversely, if pi ∈C(N,;A), µpi ∈ slS∗(C, S;C ,S)
Proof From Lemma 3 we get that piµ is individually rational. So, let us
assume that there is a blocking coalition inA of the form {c}∪Aˆ. Then {c}∪Aˆ b
piµ(b) for all b ∈ {c} ∪ Aˆ, and {c} ∪ Aˆ b piµ(b) for at least one b ∈ {c} ∪ Aˆ. But,
since the individual preferences are strict, {c} ∪ Aˆ b piµ(b) for all b ∈ {c} ∪ Aˆ
indeed. Otherwise, {c} ∪ Aˆ = piµ(b) for all b ∈ {c} ∪ Aˆ and therefore, it could
not be a blocking coalition to piµ. Now, B = ({c} ∪ Aˆ)\µ(c). Certainly, B ⊆ S
and B ∩ µ(c) = φ. Let us define A = (({c} ∪ Aˆ)∩ µ(c))\{c}. Then A ⊆ µ(c) and
A∪B = Aˆ. Moreover, since {c}∪ Aˆ b piµ(b) for all b ∈ {c}∪ Aˆ we conclude that
the pair c and B blocks∗ µ, a contradiction which proves that piµ ∈CW (N,;A).
Conversely, let pi ∈C(N,;A). Once more, because of Lemma 3, µpi is indi-
vidually stable. Now, let c ∈ C and B ∈ S be a blocking pair to µpi. Then
B ∩ µ(c) = φ and there exists A ⊆ µ(c) such that for each s ∈ A ∪ B,
{c}∪A∪B >s µpi(s), {c}∪A∪B >c µpi(c), But, since {c}∪A∪B belongs to A,
the latter relationships imply that {c}∪A∪B blocks pi, which is a contradiction.
This proves that µpi is stable∗.
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Theorem 5 Let (C, S;C ,S) be a many-to-one matching with preferences
over colleagues, and (N,;A) its related hedonic game. Then the following con-
ditions are equivalent.
a)slS∗(C, S;C ,S) 6= φ.
b)C(C, S;C ,S) 6= φ.
c)(N,;A) is pivotally balanced.
d)(C, S;C ,S) is p-balanced.
Proof The equivalence between a) and b) is given in Theorem 2. The equiv-
alence between a) and c) follows from Proposition 4 and part b) of Theorem
1. So, we are going to show now the equivalence between c) and d). Let us
assume first that (N,;A) is pivotally balanced with respect to an A- distri-
bution I. We claim that (C, S;C ,S) is p-balanced with respect to the same
distribution I. To see this, let B be an I-balanced family of coalition in CS (we
recall that A = CS). Since (N,;A) is pivotally balanced, there is a partition
pi ∈ PA(N) such that, for each i ∈ N, pi(i) i B for at least one B ∈ B(i).
But, taking into account the definition of µpi (see (3) and (4)) it follows that
µpi(i) = pi(i) i B, showing the pivotal balancedness of (C, S;C ,S). The
converse is proved similarly by taking into account the association between any
matching µ in the matching problem and the partition piµ (see (5) and (6)) in
the associated hedonic game.
Remark 1 The characterization of C(C, S;C ,S) in terms of the set of
fixed point of the T algorithm given by Echenique and Yenmez [11] indicates
that any of the statements in Theorem 5 is equivalent to the following one: e)
The set of fixed point of T is non-empty.
Remark 2 Since balancedness for a matching problem (C, S;C ,S) clearly
implies its p-balancedness, it turns to be that balancedness is a sufficient condi-
tion for the non-emptiness of C(C, S;C ,S).
5 The classical many-to-one matching problem
A classical many-to-one matching problem is a matching problem (C, S;C ,S)
where the individual preference for each student is a strict preference over the
set of colleges. In this case, the preferences do not depend on colleagues.
We recall that a matching in (C, S;C ,S) is a function µ : C ∪S → C ∪W
satisfying:
a) For each c ∈ C,if µ(c) 6= φ, then µ(c) ∈ W.
b) For each s ∈ W, if |µ(s)| = 1, then µ(s) ∈ C and µ(s) = c if and only if
s ∈ µ(c).
A matching µ is blocked∗ by c ∈ C, φ 6= B ⊆ S if c s µ(s) for all
s ∈ B, and there exists A ⊆ µ(c) such that A ∪ B c µ(c). A matching µ
is stable∗ (Echenique and Oviedo (2004)) if it is individually rational (see Roth
and Sotomayor (1990)) and there is no pair c ∈ C, φ 6= B ⊆ S blocking∗ µ.
slS∗(C, S;C ,S) will stand for the set of stable∗ matchings of (C, S;C ,S).
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With each classical many-to-one matching problem we associate its lexi-
cographical extension (C, S;C ,S), which is another many-to-one matching
problem but having preferences depending on colleagues where, for each c ∈ C,
and A,B ∈ CS(c), Ac B if and only if (A∩ S) c (B ∩ S) and, for each s ∈ S
and A,B ∈ CS(s), As B if and only if
(A ∩ C)  s(B ∩ C)if(A ∩ C) 6= (B ∩ C), or
(A ∩ S)  c(B ∩ S)if(A ∩ C) = (B ∩ C) = {c}.
Remark 2 Although Dutta and Masso´ [7] also study a many-to-one matching
model with lexicographical preferences, we point out that theirW-lexicographical
preferences for the members of W (S in our model) are very different of ours.
Indeed, they assume that each w ∈ W has an ordering on the subsets of W
which prevails on any ordering that w could have on the members of F , while in
our model each s ∈ S (W in Dutta-Masso´’s model) first care about the members
of C (F in their model) and later, on the subsets of S if two coalitions sharing
the same c ∈ C are being compared. But even in this latter case, the comparing
ordering is borrowed from the common agent c, and thus, there is not a unique
ordering on the subsets of S like in the Dutta and Masso´ model.
Theorem 6 Let (C, S;C ,S) be a many-to-one matching classical prob-
lem and let (C, S;C ,S) be its lexicographical extension. Then the following
conditions are equivalent.
a)slS∗(C, S;C ,S) 6= φ.
b)(C, S;C ,S) is p-balanced.
Proof According to the equivalence between c) and d) stated in Theorem 5,
(C, S;C ,S) is p-balanced if and only if the associated hedonic game (N,
;A) to (C, S;C ,S) is pivotally balanced. On the other hand, according to
Theorem 9 in Cesco [5][5], slS∗(C, S;C ,S) 6= φ if and only if (N, ˆ;A) is
pivotally balanced where the latter is also a hedonic game associated to the
classical many-to-one matching problem, and whose definition is given in the
Appendix. Thus, the equivalence between a) and b) is completed by noting that
(N, ˆ;A) = (N,;A).
Remark 3 Because of Theorem 5 and Theorem 2 of Echenique and Oviedo
[9], it turns to be that a necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a
classical many-to-one matching problem (C, S;C ,S) be non-empty is that its
lexicographical extension (C, S;C ,S) be p-balanced. Moreover, for this class
of matching problems, the statements in Theorem 6 are also equivalent to the
following ones:
c)slS∗(C, S;C ,S) 6= φ.
d)The set of fixed point of the T algorithm is non-empty.
If the matching problem has substitutable preferences, then all of them are
also equivalent to
e)slS(C, S;C ,S) 6= φ, where slS(C, S;C ,S) indicates the set of stable
matchings.
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XWe refer the reader to Echenique and Oviedo [9] where these equivalences
have been proven.
6 Appendix
Cesco [5] associates a hedonic game (N, ˆ;A) to a given classical many-to-
one matching problem (C, S;C ,S) and show that slS∗(C, S;C ,S) is non-
empty if and only if the game has has non-empty core. Here we indicate how to
construct the game.
Let (C, S;C ,S) be a classical many-to-one matching problem.
We recall that a matching in (C, S;C ,S) is a function µ : C ∪S → C ∪W
satisfying:
a) For each c ∈ C,if µ(c) 6= φ, then µ(c) ∈ W.
b) For each s ∈ W, if |µ(s)| = 1, then µ(s) ∈ C and µ(s) = c if and only if
s ∈ µ(c).
A matching µ is blocked∗ by c ∈ C, φ 6= B ⊆ S if c s µ(s) for all s ∈ B,
and there exists A ⊆ µ(c) such that A ∪ B c µ(c). A matching µ is stable∗ if
it is individually rational (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) and there is no pair
c ∈ C, φ 6= B ⊆ S blocking∗ µ.
We now define the associated hedonic game (N, ˆ;A) to (C, S;C ,S). Let
N = C ∪ S and A = CS (see Section 3). The preference profile ˆ = (ˆi)i∈N is
defined as follows. For each i ∈ N such that i = c for some c ∈ C, for each pair
A,B of coalitions in A(i), we say that AˆiB if and only if (A∩ S) c (B ∩ S).
On the other hand, for each i ∈ N such that i = s for some s ∈ S, for each pair
A,B of coalitions in A(i), AˆiB if and only if
(A ∩ C)  s(B ∩ C)if(A ∩ C) 6= (B ∩ C)and
(A ∩ S)  c(B ∩ S)if(A ∩ C) = (B ∩ C) = {c},
and if we agree in putting {s} s {s}, it turns out that ˆi is a strict, reflexive,
complete and transitive preference on A(i).
Clearly the game (N, ˆ;A) coincides with the game (N, ˆ;A) defined in
Section 4.
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